Autism Spectrum Disorder: Objective, Rigorous, and Emotional Moral Agency

Abstract

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) refers to a set of neurodevelopmental disorders characterized by deficits in social communication and social interactions, as well as restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities (1). Social interaction deficits notably include difficulties in empathic processes, often considered as affecting moral abilities in people suffering from ASD. Several studies in psychology and neuroscience have attempted to detect disturbed empathic processes that cause alterations in their understanding of morality (2-4). Social problems in autistic people are manifested by difficulties in their affective lives concerning their own emotional states (5-9). In this paper, I suggest that moral particularities of people with autism are a consequence of their particularities in emotional access, namely the way they relate to their own emotions, and not a consequence of empathic deficits. I will show that these particularities do not prevent them from belonging to the moral community. People with autism can indeed be rigorous moral agents, that is to say, they display a tendency to moral intransigence and inflexibility. These characteristics will be explained. In light of dual process theories, I will show how socio-emotional and moral particularities are underpinned by an overuse of type 2 processes, namely an overuse of deliberate and rule-based cognitive reasoning, instead of type 1 automatic processes. The main purpose of this study is to highlight the particularities that allow people with autism to be moral agents who, although inflexible, are nonetheless emotionally committed in moral situations.